George Berkeley and David Hume's Criticisms of John Locke's Concept of Substance
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2022
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Beytulhikme Felsefe Cevresi
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
J. Locke, the leading representative of British empiricism, uses the term substance in two different senses in his epistemology. One of them is the substance, which is the sum of the qualities, while the other is the substance, which means the support (substratum), but unknown, of these qualities. Substance, which is the sum of qualities, means the reality of objects. The most talked about thing is substance as support. Locke argues that we have ideas of this substance, albeit blurred, but that we cannot fully indicate its existence. Locke's understanding of this substance has been highly criticized by Berkeley and Hume, who are in the same philosophical tradition. While Berkeley acts from the assumption that to exist is to be perceived (esse est percipi), Hume puts the thesis that we cannot have an idea of what does not have an impression. Therefore, both philosophers try to refute Locke's claims about substance within the framework of his epistemological assumptions based on empiricism. In this article, the substance understandings of three important British philosophers within the same philosophical tradition will be examined in the context of the aforementioned assumptions, and it will be argued that Berkeley and Hume have a more consistent epistemological argumentation.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, substance, idea
Kaynak
Beytulhikme-An International Journal of Philosophy
WoS Q Değeri
N/A
Scopus Q Değeri
Cilt
12
Sayı
1
