George Berkeley and David Hume's Criticisms of John Locke's Concept of Substance

dc.contributor.authorCiltepe, Rojan
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-04T20:11:41Z
dc.date.available2024-08-04T20:11:41Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.departmentİnönü Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractJ. Locke, the leading representative of British empiricism, uses the term substance in two different senses in his epistemology. One of them is the substance, which is the sum of the qualities, while the other is the substance, which means the support (substratum), but unknown, of these qualities. Substance, which is the sum of qualities, means the reality of objects. The most talked about thing is substance as support. Locke argues that we have ideas of this substance, albeit blurred, but that we cannot fully indicate its existence. Locke's understanding of this substance has been highly criticized by Berkeley and Hume, who are in the same philosophical tradition. While Berkeley acts from the assumption that to exist is to be perceived (esse est percipi), Hume puts the thesis that we cannot have an idea of what does not have an impression. Therefore, both philosophers try to refute Locke's claims about substance within the framework of his epistemological assumptions based on empiricism. In this article, the substance understandings of three important British philosophers within the same philosophical tradition will be examined in the context of the aforementioned assumptions, and it will be argued that Berkeley and Hume have a more consistent epistemological argumentation.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.18491/beytulhikme.1884
dc.identifier.endpage179en_US
dc.identifier.issn1303-8303
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage165en_US
dc.identifier.trdizinid1142136en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.18491/beytulhikme.1884
dc.identifier.urihttps://search.trdizin.gov.tr/yayin/detay/1142136
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11616/92901
dc.identifier.volume12en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000787814200005en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/Aen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakTR-Dizinen_US
dc.language.isotren_US
dc.publisherBeytulhikme Felsefe Cevresien_US
dc.relation.ispartofBeytulhikme-An International Journal of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectLockeen_US
dc.subjectBerkeleyen_US
dc.subjectHumeen_US
dc.subjectsubstanceen_US
dc.subjectideaen_US
dc.titleGeorge Berkeley and David Hume's Criticisms of John Locke's Concept of Substanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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